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THE RULE OF LAW: BUT OF WHICH LAW?
NATURAL AND POSITIVE LAW IN
POST-COMMUNIST
TRANSFORMATIONS
IGOR GRAZIN*
INTRODUCTION

In addition to other important global consequences, the collapse of Communism in Europe and the Soviet Union dissolved all
principal socio-political institutions in those countries. These institutions included not only state structures, but also the dominant
political party, public organizations and laws. Society reverted to its
initial stage - all institutions and organizations had to be rebuilt.
These countries faced the inevitable, they had to start anew; modest
or gradual reforms were not feasible.
The natural law theory which underlies society's initial stage
holds a long and outstanding history: from Aristotle to St. Thomas
Aquinas, up to "contrat social" of Rousseau, and the natural law of
Grotius. Although some very outstanding theorists' have made efforts to give natural law a more contemporary empirical meaning, it
still largely remains within the province of academic discussions
and research. The lack of proper or adequate understanding on the
level of common legal knowledge was evidently demonstrated during the confirmation hearings of Justice Clarence Thomas in the
United States Senate.
Although the natural law idea has prevailed in developed and
advanced democratic countries, the situation in post-communist
countries is principally different. In other words, while judges in
the United States must adhere to certain professional skills and
ethical standards in deciding questions of law, judges in the former
communist countries are not bound by these stable ethical standards; nor, for the judges, do these principles even exist. With the
collapse of former social organization, all principles that imple** Professor and Faculty Fellow, University of Notre Dame. Former Peoples' Deputy of the USSR.
EDITOR'S NOTE: Some of the sources cited to in this Article are written in
Russian. We have taken every effort to translate them correctly. However,
because of the variances in interpreting, they may not be direct translations.
1. See LON L. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER (Kenneth I.
Winston ed., 1981); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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mented philosophy and the meaning of law - codes, procedures,
numerous governmental decrees, instructions and orders, decisions
have disappeared or at least lost their stability and uncontested
technical applicability. As I have said elsewhere, all the principal
questions of legal being - what is law and what is the Law, what is
its justification and validity, what is justice and who has the right of
legal judgment and many other related questions - have once
again obtained their initial significance and simplicity. Institutions,
organizations and man-made laws are extinct, or have become so
unstable that in searching for justification all that is left is God,
Man, Nature, and Society whose relationships must be rebuilt.
In spite of journalistic outcries, the collapse of communism did
not result in lawless societies. Although the system of man-made
positive law was shaken and destroyed, life goes on. The police still
prosecute the criminals, who are punished by the judges; contracts
are signed and often fulfilled; parliaments and presidents are
elected. However, it is not clear which law was correct and applicable in these cases. I believe this situation provides traditional legal
positivists - especially the analytical branch - with their most serious theoretical challenge in modern times. Although in many
cases it is easy to prove that there were no legal sovereigns 2 in 198991, it is almost impossible to prove that there were no laws. What
this means is that the lawyers must find legal sovereignty somewhere, but not in the textbooks. Thus, when we think about law
and the new world order, we still have to ask ourselves, "Which
law? What order?" and "What is new about them?" Although I do
not know the answers to these questions, I will use the dramatic
transformations in Eastern Europe and Russia to advocate the concept of natural law.
Although the idea of the supremacy of law in society is fairly
complicated, it was considered antisocial and heretic from the
Marxist point of view. To quote Nikita Krushchev, "Who's the
Boss: we or the law? We are masters over the law, not the law over
us ...."3 This statement is not an arrogant rhetorical statement of
a plain and outspoken Soviet leader. Instead, this is a position resulting from the very core of Marxist theory: the "new type" of
statehood corresponding with the socialist society.
By referring to two classical works of Marxism-Leninism,
2. John Austin formulated the basis of analytical positivistic doctrine in
the following way: "Every positive law, or every law, simply and strictly so
called, is set by a sovereign person or a sovereign body of persons, to a member
or members of the independent political society wherein that person or body is
sovereign or supreme." JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 87 (Robert
Campbell ed., 1875).
3. KONSTANTIN M. SIMIs, USSR: THE CORRUPT SOCIETY 39 (1982).
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Marx's Civil War in France4 and Lenin's State and Revolution,5
one sees the most crucial deviations from mainstream democratic
political thought of the 19th and 20th centuries. In these works, the
authors outline their political beliefs based on analysis of the Paris
7
Commune experiences 6 and the Soviet workers' strike committees.
They emphasize that the new proletarian socialist state has to
"overcome" the partiality and class-restrictedness of "bourgeois
principle" of separation of powers. They recite that "real democratism" can only be achieved through direct representation of workers
in simple monocameral bodies unifying all three principal functions: legislative, executive, and judiciary. According to Lenin, the
parliamentarian Soviets "have to work themselves, they have to follow their own laws, to check their implementation in reality and be
directly responsible to the voters."
Therefore, this "supreme
body" obtains all of the power available in addition to a legalized
opportunity to act with discretion and at its own pleasure. Consequently, supreme state power is placed in the legal position of
standing above positive laws.
Because of these beliefs, it is natural to consider that the idea of
a supreme binding power of law deviated from the orthodox Marxist vision of the proper and just organization of society. Indeed, almost all university textbooks discussing the general theories of the
state and law in the former communist countries deal with nonMarxist and "bourgeois" theory by only briefly criticizing the idea
of a state governed by law. However, these sources do not support
the idea that the communist legal nihilism abolished law completely; instead, they suggest that law continued in the communist
states, but functioned only within the scope of less important, routine and non-political cases. One the other hand, when a case involved major social importance, political significance, or parties of
certain official
political ranking, communist
authorities
subordinated the rule of law to their discretion and expediency.
The very existence of some law, in its normative sense, has always been theoretically inconvenient for Marxism. Hans Kelsen 9
demonstrated that all classical authorities in Soviet theory of law
interpreted the phenomenon of law in socialist society as something
very exceptional, transitional, or temporary. E. B. Pashukanis
wrote: "It must ...be borne in mind that morality, law, and state
are forms of bourgeois society. The fact that the proletariat may be
4. KARL MARX, THE CIVIL WAR IN FRANCE (1940).
5. VLADIMIR I. LENIN, STATE AND REVOLUTION (1943).

6. MARx, supra note 4, at 54-82.
7. LENIN, supra note 5, at 17-24, 75.
8. 8 LENIN, POLNOE SOBRANYE SOCHINENII 48 (1962) (in Russian).
9.

HANs KELSEN, THE COMMUNIST THEORY OF LAW (1955).
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compelled to use them by no means signifies that they can develop
further in the direction of being filled with a socialist content."'10 In
the works of Stuchka, and even more in those of Pashukanis, economic relationships replaced law. As a direct consequence, economic management was one of the most important functions of the
state. The constraints of law did not bind the state, it was merely
one means of social regulation. "The state as a meta-legal fact cannot [according to Marxism] be conceived of as subjected to the law
and hence not as a legal subject ... ."11 As Hans Kelsen has correctly concluded, in practice, Marxism meant the extreme form of
sociological relativism in legal theory combined with political prag2
matism of communist ideology.'
With this basis of socialist theory in mind, it becomes apparent
that this shift was of principle significance when the Nineteenth
Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ("CPSU")
reintroduced the notion of a law-governed state.' 3 As Pashukanis
correctly warned six decades earlier, the supremacy of law and socialism are incompatible. Although this statement appears correct
from a socialist point of view, it is not necessarily so from a formally
positivistic point. The paradox here is that the principle of legality
itself can be formally eliminated with positive law, as the course of
Soviet constitutional development demonstrates. The latest, and
last, Soviet constitution 14 introduced a special clause' 5 that abolished not only the rest of its text, but the rest of the legislation also.
Article 6 provided:
ARTICLE 6. The leading and guiding force of Soviet society and
the nucleus of its political system, of all state organisation and public
organisations, is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CPSU
exists for the people and serves the people.
The Communist Party, armed with Marxism-Leninism, determines the general perspectives of the development of society and the
course of the home and foreign policy of the USSR, directs the great
constructive work of the Soviet people, and imparts a planned, systematic and theoretically substantiated character to their struggle for the
victory of communism.

10. Id. at 106 (quoting E.B. Pashukanis).
11. Id. at 95.
12. Id. at 193. The awesome reality of this doctrine has been brilliantly
described in chapters 8, 9, and 10 of Volume I of ALEKSANDR I. SOLZHENITSYN,
THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO 1918-56 (Thomas P. Whitney trans., 1817).
13. For more details, refer to Mart Susi, The Meaning, Genesis and Perspectives of the Concept of Law-Governed State (Pravovoe Gosudarstvo) in Recent
Soviet Legal Theory (1991) (unpublished LL.M. Thesis, University of Wisconsin
(Madison)).
14. KONST. USSR (1977).
15. Id., art. 6.
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All party organisations shall function within the framework of the
16
Constitution of the USSR.
Without further details or specifications, Article 6 placed political and legal discretion above the rule of law. Thus, even the formal "legalization" of the notion of law-governed state subordinated
the rule of law to the superiority of the dominant monopolistic
party. Although Article 6 was formally valid, 17 the question remained whether other extra-positivistic criteria of validity were
met.
I.

ADMINISTRATION V. LITIGATION

The term "administrative law" in the continental European
legal system in its former socialist part is fairly ambiguous unlike
our Anglo-American counterpart. First, administrative law means
the law directly applicable to the sphere of administration. It allows administrative and managerial jurisdiction as long as the situation falls within the sphere of state regulation. This includes the
relationships between the minister and the head of departments in
the governmental ministry, the chief of the fire department and his
fire inspector, and the governor and his chief of staff.' 8 In this
sense, administrative law is a counterpart to constitutional (state)
law that deals with the legislative rather than the executive branch
of government.
Similarly, administrative law connotes another meaning. This
meaning covers administrative power exercised by executive authorities over "outsiders," those who are not routinely part of state
administration. It controls contact between private citizens and executive officials. This definition includes the relationships between
drivers and traffic patrolman, clients and the state notary, and taxpayers and the revenue collector.
Without further elaborating on the distinctions between the
two meanings of "administrative law," one can discern their common feature. In all of these situations, the relations between the
two parties are based upon certain legally fixed and regulated inequalities. The minister has the right to demand reports from the
16. Id. Under such limitless rights, the "framework" loses all structure.
We may only guess why the previous Soviet constitutions did not contain such a
clause including Stalin's constitution of 1936. Most probably, the openly totalitarian regime did not feel any need to make its actions under such constitutional covers.
17. The Article was passed by the formally valid procedure, namely,
through the formally legal and internationally recognized parliament - the
Supreme Soviet of USSR.

18. This is not the case when we talk about private corporations because
they are not exercising state power. In addition, their internal relations are not
regulated by legal administrative means. Nonetheless, another law may be applicable, such as labor legislation.
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head of the department and not vice versa. The traffic policeman
may penalize the speeding driver, but the driver has no power to
check the policeman. 19 Within administrative law, this inequality
constitutes the principal foundation of legal regulation.
Unlike administrative law, civil law is diametrically opposite.
Regulating primarily the relations of property, ownership, contracts and wills, civil law assumes that the participants are legally
equal and that they enter their relationships with sound and free
will. Thus, the individuals or entities are responsible for their own
acts. If a dispute arises, the complaining party must specifically
prove the lack of free will and establish that the assumption of
equality is not present. If the complaining party presents such
proof, civil law may invalidate the whole transaction. 20 This material assumption is reflected procedurally since the plaintiff and defendant in a civil suit are not subordinated to each other, but rather
hold the same rights and equal procedural standing.
However, equal standing exists between the parties only under
one other condition; the parties must in fact be separate, controlling
their own resources, acts, and obligations. Consequently, civil legislation and procedure conflicted with socialist theories from the very
beginning. The basic feature of the socialist society in its Soviet or
Soviet-influenced version is that "all means of production, all productive organizations, are state owned [or controlled]."'21 Since
"all" here really means "almost all," strictly speaking there are no
"civil legal" entities or separate individual owners. Thus, no persons or entities exist upon which to apply civil law and procedure.
Pashukanis clearly understood this problem when he restricted
civil law to its private versions, those unremarkable, remote provinces of socialist society that were not under direct state
22
regulation.
With these distinctions in mind, and from a purely legal point
of view, there was something else that replaced civil law when socialism was introduced. When describing the Soviet economy, Sta19. However, it does not matter that in other situations, this inequality

ceases to exist. The department head may sue the minister if the minister runs
into the department head's car because that is a clear case of property damage,

i.e., a civil case.
20. The lack of free will and clear understanding invalidated certain legal
actions under the Roman law. Justinian's "Institutes" elaborated on this topic
specifically when dealing with the validity of wills. JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES 69
(Peter Birks and Grant McLeod trans., 1987). The invalidation of contracts due
to their inequality was based on proof of mistake, fraud , and duress. PH. J.
THOMAS, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 83 (1986).
21. Michael Keren, On the (Im)Possibility of Market Socialism, in THE
ROAD TO CAPITALISM: ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND
THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 45 (David Kennett & Marc Liberman eds., 1992)
[hereinafter THE ROAD TO CAPITALISM].
22. KELSEN, supra note 9, at 93-94.
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lin often utilized one metaphor: "Huge single factory." Although
the excesses of his totalitarian version vanished after his death, the
metaphor remained sound. Indeed, state-appointed managers and
state officials operated the state-owned factory. In turn, the state
managers were subordinate to governmental ministries and departments. Similarly, the ministries and departments were under orders and directives of the bodies in charge of planning, price setting
and distribution.23 In other words, all these relationships fell
within the execution of state powers based on subordination, the
sphere of regulation by administrative law. As Guy Sorman puts it,
"State enterprise in the socialist world is [not an economic but] an
'24
administrative unit subordinated to the logic of administration.
Therefore, administrative law replaced civil law in the socialist
25
regimes.
Nonetheless, it does not necessarily follow that lawlessness and
voluntaristic discretion prevailed simply because administrative law
governed the economy generally and industrial production specifically. Though principally different from the civil law, administrative law is nonetheless law. Likewise, merely because one is
administratively subordinated, that does not mean a person lacks
rights. Individuals were still protected by other laws, such as labor
laws.
Thus, if a minister desired to fire an incompetent
subordinate, he faced the possible risk of being involved in labor
litigation in which he would have to prove and defend his position
under labor law. Consequently, even the province of administrative
law provided certain per se procedural guarantees to the
subordinate parties in certain circumstances. For instance, under
the former Soviet administrative legal system, the advisory boards
of ministries (usually made up of the department heads of the same
ministries) had the right, when they disagreed with the minister, to
appeal to the next level of government, the Council of Ministers.
Likewise, being subordinated in the administrative hierarchy
did not by itself necessarily deprive those individuals of their principal rights. The inequality in these relationships is part of the "rule
of the game" known to participants in advance. A person applying
23. See Heinz Kohler, Soviet Central Planning,in THE ROAD TO CAPITALISM, supra note 21, at 5-14; Larissa Popkova-Pijasheva, Why is the Plan Incompatible with the Market?, in THE ROAD TO CAPITALISM, supra note 21, at 53-58
(discussing mechanics of planning and plan enforcement).
24. Guy SORMAN, ABANDON SOCIALISM 176 (1991) (in Russian).
25. There were other replacements as well. By rejecting civil law, one of
the most important parts of private law was also automatically rejected. Therefore, property relations, initially the core of private law, fell under the regulatory means of public law. Lenin, himself a lawyer by education, put it very
clearly: "We [the communists] do not recognize anything private for us all
spheres of economy are public-legal and not private ones." LENIN, supra note 8,
at 44.
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for a position in the United States Department of Agriculture
knows in advance that he or she must obey certain commands and
knows the consequences of failing to do so. However, this was not
the case with the Soviet-type administration in the economic
sphere. Although theoretically controlled by the state, ruled by its
plan-orders, and managed by nominated officials, the economic system failed to operate as designed. Consequently, loopholes endured
in the initially designed mechanism. The fault lies in the control
system. The plan-orders were designed to control, but they failed to
function. In fact, the whole set of control mechanism was unable to
function. Therefore, the "rules of the game" were somewhat
obscured.
Nonetheless, the economy kept moving, although inefficiently
and costly. This was due to those elements of the system which
were not governed by the plan and plan fulfillment oriented legislation. Other mechanisms evolved to sustain the economy. For example, managers compensated shortcomings in supplies by strange
systems of expeditors as well as semi-legal and illegal transfer of
goods and equipment through "quasi" markets. John H. Litwack
put it correctly: "[I]t is impossible to be a successful manager in a
Soviet-type economy without continually breaking the law."2 6 A
manager could not continue production because he had not received
adequate supplies of raw materials through official channels of distribution. Therefore, he asked an individual hired for this purpose
to obtain the materials "directly" (not through the chain of state
provided suppliers) from their producer, in exchange for some
other sort of "favor" (such as a bribe). Consequently, the manager
was able to keep the business going. At the same time, the man27
ager's actions fell under the provisions of a criminal code.
We may put aside for a moment the rationality of this regulation itself. Whatever the legal rule, whether good or bad, it does not
matter here. The rule operates through certain mechanisms of
automation. As Ronald Dworkin put it, "Rules are applicable in an
all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a rule stipulates are given, then
either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be
accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes nothing to the
28
decision."
26. John M. Litwack, Legality and Market Reform in Soviet-Type Economies, in THE ROAD TO CAPITALISM, supra note 21, at 113. See PAUL C. ROBERTS
& KAREN LAFOLLETE, MELTDOWN: INSIDE THE SOVIET ECONOMY 7-38 (1990) for
an excellent description of managerial acrobatics required by the managers in
this system.
27. Russian, Art. 153, section 2 of the criminal code. The "commercial mediation" was punished by up to 5 years of imprisonment with the confiscation of
personal property.
28. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 24 (1977).
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Therefore, if individuals obey the rules, there will be no negative legal consequences. Conversely, if the rules are violated, ideally sanctions will follow. However, this is not the case in Soviettype administrations. Because almost all managers violated the
law, 29 particularly the criminal laws, the state could not punish all
of them. If it did, the economy would have halted. Thus, even
though almost all managers violated the law, the state punished
only some of them. However, the state determined whom to punish
not by law, but by discretion.30 States utilized a combination of
individual circumstances to determine whether a successful manager went to jail or was awarded the title of a Hero of Socialist Labour. Thus, the Soviet managers' "rules of the game" included the
risks of administration discretion resulting from the state's departing from the automatic application of the law; much different from
the situation facing an applicant to the United States Department of
Agriculture.
II.

THE SCOPE OF CIVIL LAW: WHAT WAS PRESERVED?

Even though the socialist regime was based on principles inconsistent with civil law, civil law and litigation existed in socialist societies. Not only did a civil code exist based on European and ancient
Roman traditions, but civil law was taught in law schools. In addition, courts applied civil law to a wide range of cases.
First, courts applied civil law in cases involving private citizens
or cooperative organizations whose property was officially separate
from the state's. Second, courts applied civil law to cases arising
between state-owned economic entities which were politically,
macro-economically or otherwise neutral from the interests of the
socialist state. Courts heard these disputes even though the state
29. This inevitability of violations is a crucial point. Mancur Olson makes
an ingenious observation: "Though economists have a relatively well developed
theory of why markets work, neither they nor specialists in any other discipline
have any satisfactory explanation of why Soviet-type economies worked at all."
Mancur Olson, The Hidden Path to a Successful Economy, in THE EMERGENCE
OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 56 (Christopher Clague & Gordon
C. Rausser eds., 1992). One of the elements of explanation provides as follows:
Paradoxically, they performed as well as and survived as long as they did in
part because of the many markets, legal and illegal, explicit and implicit,
that they contained ....
Though not all of the implicit and illicit transactions were socially desirable, many of them were indispensable for correcting the shortcomings in the state plans and for maintaining production
in state enterprises.
Id. at 63.
30. Let us use a more familiar analogy to clarify this point. On the toll road
with a speed limitation of 55 miles per hour, the traffic might move at a speed of
60-65 miles per hour (not such a rare case, is it?). This is not a rule-based decision, but the discretion of a traffic policeman whom to stop and fine and whom
to let go.
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was the sole owner of all significant means of production because it
was physically impossible for the state to administer all this property on a daily basis. Therefore, some type of mechanism of dispute
settlement was needed to handle the routine cases without direct
interference from the top units of governmental administration.
Thus, courts stepped in and handled these matters.
Although civil law provided the formula for this court mechanism, the court did not have the final say in dispute settlement. In
cases of significant importance, or if an official felt the need to exercise his discretion, administrative means were used to overturn the
legal solution. In fact, administrative means often overruled civil
decisions. They included such things as ministerial orders not to
sue contractors for their violations and the compensation of plaintiffs from the ministerial "reserve funds," changes in the range of
"doperative managerial" rights of a given enterprise or its charter,
and the procedures of state arbitration (actually administrative
31
arbitration).
One of the living classics of Soviet civil law3 2 provides the analysis of the civil legal status of a socialist enterprise. Being an "operative administrator" of state property, the socialist enterprise
possessed seemingly all the title of an owner to possess, use, and
dispose of, but only within the "limits established by law. 3 3 Besides that, the titleholder functioned in accordance with (a) the purpose of its activity (fixed in the charter granted by the state), (b)
planned tasks, and (c) the purpose of the property.34 Because all
these conditions were put forward in an administrative way, mainly
through governmental decree (with the exception of the most general so called five year plan), administrative superiors also determined whether these conditions were met in any particular case
and whether to interfere in the economic activities of an enterprise.
Despite the existence of civil law, society's success or survival
depended on something else, a non-positive law. This was due to
the flexibility of the legal regime. Positive law existed, but it was
not posited. In other words, it was not enforced, or even enforceable. Thus, the non-positive law was the something that made ra35
tional behavior and predictions possible.
31. The system of state arbitration was "developed in part to resolve property rights disputes between state enterprises, but its scope was limited and its
functions confused since it made rules, interpreted them, and enforced them."
David Kennett, The Role of Law in a Market Economy, in THE ROAD TO CAPITALISM, supra note 21, at 104.
32. OLIMPIAD S. IOFFE & PETER B. MAGGS, THE SOVIET ECONOMIC SYSTEM:
A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1987).

33. Id. at 70-71.
34. Id.
35. Ludwig von Mises described the economic aspect of this
(un)predictability as follows: "Since under socialism economic calculation is
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This is the point where natural law normally fits in. However,
in socialist reality this was not so. In socialism, classical natural law
was replaced by a special sort of political ideology that started to
function like natural law. It may sound paradoxical, but the socialist denial and rejection of natural law was also a natural-legalistic
position which resulted not in the exclusion of natural law, but instead, in a shift from good natural law to bad natural law.
III.

IS IT GOOD TO IMPLEMENT BAD LAW?

Natural law, as opposed to man-made positive law, is often considered to be something fairly abstract, vague, and unwritten. Even
if reduced to writing, natural law appears in forms which are not
considered legal; for example, holy scriptures, scholarly treatises,
and political declarations. However, although rarely, some elements of natural law may still be found in positive law texts: constitutions, preambles, introductory articles, or statutes. 36 However, in
these documents, the rules of natural law need to be further specified and detailed before they can be applied to specific situations. In
detailing natural laws, definers are faced with two options: (1)
transform natural law clauses into more specific rules of positive
law, or (2) directly apply the natural laws in practice without the
application of the positive rules of law. Socialist legality adopted
the latter option.
As previously stated, socialist states replaced natural law with
communist ideology. Indeed, Lenin did not deny the role of morality. Instead, he replaced natural, normal, divine and human morality with an artificial, manmade, anti-natural pragmatism that
looked like morality. At the Third Congress of Communist Youth
Organization, Lenin declared that there is only one criterion of real
morality: faithfulness to the ideas of communism and to the cause
of the Communist Party. Therefore, from a legal point of view, because the "Lenin morality" was a substitute for the real roots of
natural law, this quasi-morality and quasi-natural law inevitably
and logically entered the positive legal texts just as natural law
would have.
impossible, under socialism there can be no economic activity in our sense of the
word. In small and insignificant things rational action might still persist. But,
for the most part, it would no longer be possible to speak of rational production." Ludwig von Mises, Economic Calculations in Socialism, in ROAD TO
CAPITALISM, supra note 21, at 37. In other words, rationality may exist, but it is

not an economic rationality. In Mise's words, "the wheels.., go round, but to
no effect." Id.
36. The famous words, "[w]e hold these truths to be self-evident. . ." stood
in a political declaration as well as in the document of international and constitutional legal nature also. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S.

1776).
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We have seen an example of such a quasi-natural legal cause
before, in Article 6 of the last Soviet Constitution: "Article 6. The
leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its
political system, of all state organizations and public organizations
is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." Thus, the Soviet
Constitution afforded even traditional human and political rights
only conditionally, if and only if individuals exercised their rights
"in accordance with the aims of building communism" 7 and "in
accordance with the interests of the people and in order to
38
strengthen and develop the socialist system.
Therefore, to some extent, the existence and dominance of
communist ideology diminished the unpredictability of administrative discretion. Soviet leaders tended to pardon violations of positive law if the offender promoted communism. For example,
violations would be overlooked if the manager succeeded in fulfilling plan orders; if the law was violated by a high ranking party
official (here the assumption was that although he violated the law,
he was a good communist and that was much more important); or if
the violation happened in the course of actions that were in general
accordance with the latest propaganda campaign.
In essence, the state-controlled economy actually worked for
two reasons. It worked because the state failed to control the economy completely and because the state failed to enforce the rules
seriously. However, in the Summer of 1988, the situation in the
Soviet Union radically changed. When promoters advanced the
idea of creating a state based on positive law and its supremacy,
they upset the above established balance. Although not immediately, but inevitably, the problem had to arise: What will happen if
the immoral, unworkable, destructive laws in force under the communist regime are really enforced?
However, an ideological loophole initially remained. At the
Nineteenth Conference of CPSU, Gorbachev did not speak about a
law-governed state per se, but only about a socialist one. According
to Marxist-Leninist traditions, this could mean that society would
give positive law its supremacy only conditionally, if and only if, it
favored the socialist state, which means in reality, favoring the communist rulers. Nonetheless, it became fairly clear that this ideological loophole would not remain for long. The anti-legalistic
character of the socialist state, based on discretionary social engineering, is incompatible with the principle of legality. The co-existence of legality and the socialist state could only be a temporary,
transitional one. Once Soviet society took the position to stand on
37. KONST. USSR, arts. 47, 51.

38. Id. art. 50.
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the foundation of law, it pronounced the death sentence for
socialism.
The question of what to do with incompatible Soviet law arose
for clarification during the III Congress of People's Deputies in
March 1990. Without going deeply into the political realities of that
period and the resulting Soviet developments, two issues of legal
and constitutional significance that revealed opposition to a lawgoverned state may be explored.
First, Soviet democrats wanted to eliminate Article 6 from the
Soviet Constitution. Two years had passed since proponents proclaimed the doctrine of a socialist law-governed state. However,
nothing serious had occurred with one exception. On March 26,
1989, through a relatively democratic procedure, the Congress of
Peoples' Deputies was elected. After the election, the Congress and
its permanent body, the Supreme Soviet, began for the first time to
do what they were supposed to do-legislate. However, Article 6 on
the supremacy and meta-legal position of the Communist Party
held this legislative process and future implementation hostage.
When the question of establishing a mechanism for supervising
the Constitution arose for the first time in Soviet history, the danger of legally implementing Article 6 and legalizing the supremacy
of the CPSU became apparent. If a judiciary, established through a
democratic procedure by the body who has the authority to change
the constitution, existed to implement the Constitution, the Communist power would become legal through its ex post facto approval
by the Congress of Peoples' Deputies. Second, conservative and
moderately conservative communist forces wanted to change one of
the traditional elements of the Soviet power structure by establishing a Soviet presidency.
These two issues 39 imposed some form of compromise upon the
parliamentary parties involved. Democrats wanted Article 640
eliminated from the constitution, but opposed the institution of a
presidency evidently to be held initially by Gorbachev and, later, by
Gorbachev
possibly more conservative communist politicians.
wanted to become the president, but was opposed to the idea of constitutional acceptance of the already existing, actually multi-party
39. For a discussion of the related issue of the special political position of
the Baltic States see Herbert Hausmaninger, The Committee of Constitutional

Supervision of the USSR, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 287, 312-13 (1990).
40. Although discussed in the Soviet parliament from its first session (May
1989), the first official voting on this question was carried out only in the Second
Congress of People's Deputies, December 12, 1989. The inquiry was put very
modestly: Whether to include the question concerning Article 6 in the agenda of
the session or not. The results were 839 yeas, 1138 nays, 56 abstentions. Among
the "nays" was the vote of Gorbachev. Bulletin of the Second Congress of Peo-

ples' Deputies (in Russian) v. 1, Moscow, The Supreme Soviet, at 52-73.
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system. Finally, a political deal was made between reformist, communists and democrats: the presidency for Article 6. To become
president, Gorbachev had to give away the clause granting monopolitistic power to the CPSU.
At the same time, both of these opposing parties were united by
a common interest. Each wanted to create a mechanism to implement constitutional law. This interest served as the basis for political compromise in spite of the different results sought by the
parties. Reformist Communists wanted to achieve the positive legalization and implementation of the communist system. Democrats wanted to use and implement the clauses of the Soviet
Constitution that could lead (and actually led) to a civil society.
Consequently, the apparent compromise and unity that existed on
the level of positive law could not be achieved in reality because of
41
the differences on a natural legal level.
IV.

CASES OF AMBIGUITY-NATURAL LAW

Without dealing here with what constitutes modern natural
law, it can still be stated that from the formal-logical point of view
and regardless of its content, the positive natural law is a hierarchical structure. In general terms, the works by John Rawls 42 and
Robert Nozick 43 have exhibited that iusnaturalistic premises may
be developed to varying deviations from the initial starting point.
The academic and political discussions provide evidence that the
further natural law's content is explored, the more problematic its
statements become. For example, almost everybody agrees with
the idea that all men are equal, however, only a few are ready to
accept that all men have the right to the same salary. Therefore,
the legal processes of democratic forces in Russia and Eastern Europe, though justified by natural legal premises, need not be in compliance with natural-legalistic ideas on the more concrete level.
Furthermore, laws introduced by authority established in accordance with natural law do not automatically become iusnaturally
valid law. It means that positivistically uncritical acceptance of the
law based on authority does not work.
For example, in the August 31, 1992, issue of "Newsweek," Russia's Prosecutor General published his account of plotters of the So41. Although the Third Congress of Peoples' Deputies of the USSR actually

modified Article 6 and established the system of constitutional supervision, the
controversy behind these steps remained sound. The excellent analysis by Herbert Hausmaninger demonstrates that the committee remained a political
rather than a legal body, at least until the actual power structure of Communist
Party of the Soviet Union ("CPSU") and of its leader, Gorbachev, had been
broken or counter-balanced. See Hausmaninger, supra note 39.
42. See RAWLS, supra note 1.
43. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1977).

1993]

The Rule of Law: But of Which Law

viet communist coup of 1991. 44 The Prosecutor General made the
publication available before the plotters' trial commenced.
Although Mr. Valentin Stepankov presumably represented democratic forces and leadership in Russia, disclosure of this type of material, obtained in the course of preliminary investigation,
constituted the most serious breach not only of professional ethics
but of the generally accepted rules of criminal procedure. Newsweek's comment here is absolutely correct: "Such disclosures in a
U.S. court case could be grounds for dismissal of the charges. ' 45 In
addition, this is very close to a violation of the laws of Russia as
well. Moreover, there is another aspect of legality to this case.
Although it may sound surprising, the August coup of 1991, which
initially seemed to be an act of criminal behavior, did not amount to
a real violation of the Soviet criminal law. 46 Thus, the plotters
could easily be condemned politically but not criminally. Further,
it is doubtful, although the Prosecutor General's actions were politically blameworthy, whether such actions were prohibited in these
times and could be prosecuted at all. At the least, those actions
could not be prosecuted without evident violations of natural legal
47
principles of criminal procedure and legal ethics.
The Tax Agency of Russia provides a similar example, but
hinging on a less significant violation involving the principle of nonretroactivity. In August 1992, the Agency retroactively imposed tax
on income (at the rate of 32%) earned by stock exchanges on the
44. Valentin Stepankov & Yevgeny Lisov, The Kremlin Plot, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 31, 1992, at 38.
45. Id.
46. The qualification closest to the case may be found in Article 64 (a) of the
Criminal Code of Russia. UK RSFSR art. 64(a) (1992). Here, it was stated that
high treason may be committed in the form of "plotting aimed at seizure of
power." Id But it has to be kept in mind that the plotters were individuals who
did not need to seize the power, because they already had it. Among them were
the vice-president of the USSR, the chief of the KGB, the prime minister, and
the minister of defense. Some other articles may also be taken into consideration from Chapter XII. For example, Art. 238 pertains to Military Crimes. UK
RSFSR art. 238 (1992). A charge of disobedience to the commander may have
been brought, keeping in mind that Gorbachev at that time was the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet armed forces. However, this article is only applicable to the Minister of Defense who had military rank and position. Article
237 states that the articles of Chapter XII are applicable only to the individuals
in a military service that excludes their application for other members of junta,
the civilians. UK RSFSR art. 237 (1992). Similarly, the law could not be
changed to cover the "junta's case" because of the principle nulla poena nullum
crimen sine lege, according to which criminal legislation cannot be applied
retroactively.
47. The Criminal Code of Russia in Article 184 criminalizes "[t]he disclosure of information of preliminary investigation." UK RSFSR art. 184 (1992).
However, this article is not technically applicable to Mr. Stephankov's actions
because the crime described involves disclosure by a person without the preliminary authorization from the prosecutor or investigator. In this case, the disclosure was made by the prosecutor himself.
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sales of their permanent seats in 1991 without any adequate explanation or economic justification. Years earlier, the Ministry of Finances declared this income tax exempt if the exchanges used the
money to develop the infrastructure of the exchanges themselves.
As a result, those exchanges which undertook long term projects
and had not spent the earnings immediately, lost about one-third of
their accumulated earnings. This in turn, put them on the verge of
bankruptcy. 48 This action, by positive authorities, is an illegal act
from the natural legal point of view only if we accept the following
premise: Legal actions do not have retroactive force when they
worsen (i.e., restrict, penalize, or increase damages) the position of
persons subjected to them. Different than the Prosecutor General's
action, from the principles of criminal law, the Tax Agency's action
is more disputable. Furthermore, the actions, whether viewed as a
violation of natural law through a positive law or simply an unwise
administrative decision, undermined the trust that the business
community had invested in the new Russian government.
Whereas these examples constitute a mixture of the different
influences attributable to natural and positive law, there is one case
where the natural law has almost obtained independent standing
and direct application in the post-communist legal order. This 49
is
the Communist Party's case in the Constitutional Court of Russia.
The legal-political complications of the case itself, and the novelty
of the court's own position, required the court to hear the case and
to create a procedure for its own actions. One of many dramatic
episodes occurred in October 1992, when the court banned the former General Secretary of the Communist party, Gorbachev, from
traveling abroad because he refused to testify. This was the court's
only available legal option to coerce the insulting witness because
the court lacked any direct power to enforce its own decisions.
Only the natural legal principle, that the court has to be respected,
could justify this ban.
What came as a surprise in this case were the appeals from several Western leaders to lift the travel ban imposed upon Gorbachev.
These appeals not only violated the commonly accepted norms of
national and international law, but also exemplified the double
standards and ethical relativism inherent in the practice of positivistic thinking. The German appeal was even more amazing because
Germany had earlier demanded that Russia extradite the former
DDR's Communist leader, Erich Honecker. The message was clear:
Yes, our courts-French and German-have to be respected, but
48. Yuri Khnyckin, Shock in the Stock Exchanges: Someone Was Caught

All Were Imposed, COMMERSANT 1 (1992) (in Russian).
49. See Carla Thorson, The Fate of the Communist Party in Russia,
RFE/RL Research Report, No. 37, Sept. 18, 1992, at 1.
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yours-Russia--do not. To put it into perspective, imagine the public outcry that might follow if the Russian president suggested that
the United States Supreme Court overrule Roe v. Wade! Evidently,
the politicians' appeals revolved around a more significant goalthat of setting a precedent. In 1992, Gorbachev faced the possibility
of participating in two more trials. 5° In the long run, such positivistic appeals served the purposes of mistrial and injustice.
As Carla Thorson noted: The Russian Constitutional Court's
authority in this case rested only "on its ability to enforce its rulings
and on popular perceptions of whether these rulings are just."5'
This was the case for the whole philosophical-legal content of the
case itself. Yeltsin's suspension and the ban on the CPSU's activi'5 2
ties was not "based on strictly legal or constitutional procedures.
At the same time, because the court did not reject or immediately
enforce the claims of the parties on the basis of positive law, other
considerations, including those of natural legal character, were
given their power under the circumstances of the collapse of the old
positive regime.
Unfortunately, some months later, in December 1992, and
March 1993, the same Constitutional Court of Russia that had attempted to follow the basic natural-legal principles of due and fair
procedure with regards to the Communist Party, lost its judicial authority as an institution for creating and implementing the new
democratic legal order. By actively participating in the low-level
daily policy making53 and severely violating the procedural rules
established by itself earlier, 54 the court reduced itself to an ordinary
political party. Thus, as stated earlier, natural law by itself may be
a guideline for democratic transformations, but without positive
law support, natural law may be misused and misinterpreted under
the pressures and temptations of daily political routines. Therefore,
replacing totalitarian positive law with principles of natural and
democratic law is only the first steep required to positivize the principles of natural law.
50. Gorbachev could be asked to testify as a witness in the trial of the military junta and face questioning as to criminal negligence.
In addition,

Gorbachev could face questioning regrading the illegal exportation of the Communist Party's assets.
51. Thorson, supra note 49, at 2.

52. Id.
53. As one judge in this country said, referring to the numerous interviews
and speeches of the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court of Russia, "[t]oo
much publicity for a judge, you know."
54. In March, 1993, the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court declared
Yeltsin's presidential decree unconstitutional. The Judge did this before conducting any court hearings and moreover, even before he read it. See George J.

Church, Yeltsin's Big Gamble, TIME, Mar. 29, 1993, at 20, 23; Serge Schmemann, Speaker in RussiaNow Voicing DoubtAbout Yeltsin Ouster, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 1993, at Al.
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, between the general principles of natural law
and technical regulations of those relations that need authoritative
guidance, or are of importance to the state, the former lose their
direct significance and would lead to different legal solutions.
In the words of William Blackstone:
Upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws; that is to say, no human laws should be
suffered to contradict these. There are, it is true a great number of
indifferent points, in which both the divine law and the natural leave a
man at his own liberty; but which are found necessary for the benefit
of society to be restrained within certain limits. And herein it is that
55
human laws have their greatest force and efficacy ....
Through the technical regulations, even some parts of former "socialist" 6 legislation, those that were actually preserved and developed by the lawyers under the socialist regime, may theoretically be
kept intact or, for the sake of legal stability, only slightly modified
in the course of the re-establishment of a new social order based on
the supremacy of law.
It has been stated repeatedly that the crucial element of the
new world order (or the order in the world) is its being based on the
principle of legality, on the supremacy of law. There is no reason to
doubt the validity of such a statement. However, it prevails only
under one condition: if, and only if, this positive legality and legislation itself is derived from some legality of a higher order. Yeltsin's
decree banning the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and taking over the highest military command might, though not necessarily, violate certain elements of the positive Soviet constitution.
Nonetheless, these actions were in perfect accordance with the very
idea of constitutionalism. Although put in writing in an official
legal document (positive law) under the higher standards of legality, the ban did not violate the principles of democratic constitutionalism. Positive law does not become valid law merely because it is
55. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 42.

56. Strictly speaking, the rules of positive law under discussion are neither
socialist nor capitalist and therefore they might not only survive but even be of
some value. The right to file a civil action expires six months after the event
giving rise to the cause of action occurred. This term is politically neutral and
at the same time, something quite customary to a Russian lawyer. Moreover, in
the "Communist Party's case," Moscow democrats referred to the Stalin signed
Soviet decree of 1932 (on public associations) that permitted the "liquidation" of
political parties (if they were "purposely directed toward the violent overthrow
of, or change in, the constitutional order") by executive order. They argued
that this Decree was formally valid when Yeltsin banned the CPSU. Thorson,
supra note 49, at 3. Although the political circumstances had turned 180 degrees, the law issued by Stalin to prosecute his opponents evidently included a
more general iusnaturalistic constitutional principle able to survive under new
circumstances and to serve different purposes.
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considered official, especially if what is posited officially is political
discretion (like Article 6 of the former Soviet constitution) or the
replacement of rules by limitless ad hoc administration. These examples demonstrate that superiority, in socialist societies, was
placed in the hands of an uncontrolled and unbalanced authority
and though done in the form of legislative act, the acts themselves
failed the test of legality.
Before a country implements the rule of law, there simply
must be a rule of law, not only formally, but in substance also. This
simple truth is once again demonstrated by the struggle of
democracy-minded lawyers in Russia and Eastern Europe.

